DEFCON 20 SAFES AND CONTAINERS – INSECURITY DESIGN EXCELLANCE







DESIGN DEFECTS IN SECURITY PRODUCTS THAT HAVE REAL CONSEQUENCES IN PROTECTING LIVES AND PROPERTY

GUN SAFES: A CASE STUDY

- GUN SAFES AND PROPERTY SAFES ARE SOLD TO STORE WEAPONS
- ♦ MANY ARE NOT SECURE
- ANALYSIS OF INSECURITY
 - Boltworks and mechanism
 - Biometrics
 - Key Locks

SECURITY REPRESENTATIONS

SECURE FOR STORING WEAPONS
 CERTIFIED BY CALIFORNIA DOJ
 PROTECT KIDS FROM GUNS



MANUFACTURERS, SECURITY, and ENGINEERING

- Many manufacturers do not understand bypass techniques
- Many imports, no security, just price
- Large reputable companies sell junk
- Representations that are not true by:
 - Manufacturers
 - Dealers
 - Retail

"INSECURITY ENGINEERING": A DEFINITION

- Intersection of mechanical and security engineering
- Must have both mechanics and security
- Must understand bypass techniques and design against at all stages in process
- Develop a new way of thinking by Manufacturers
- Problem: Engineers know how to make things work but not how to break them

MYTHS ABOUT SECURITY AND PRODUCT DESIGN

- It is patented
- Engineers think the product is secure
- Product has been sold for many years
- No known bypass tools or techniques
- Product meets or exceeds standards
- Testing labs have certified the product
- Government labs say its secure
- No consumer complaints

STANDARDS: THE PROBLEM

- MEET ALL STANDARDS BUT THE LOCK OR SAFE CAN BE EASILY OPENED
 - Standards are not up-to-date
 - Not test for many methods of attack
 - Consumer relies on standards for security
 - Just because you meet standards does not mean the lock or safe is secure

 STANDARDS CAN MISLEAD THE PUBLIC
 GUN LOCK AND SAFE STANDARDS ARE INADEQUATE AND DO NOT PROTECT

CALIFORNIA DOJ STANDARDS ESSENTIALLY WORTHLESS



REGULATORY GUN SAFE STANDARDS - CAL DOJ

Section 977.50 of the CA Code of Regulations

- Shall be able to fully contain firearms and provide for their secure storage;
- Shall have a locking system consisting of at minimum a mechanical or electronic combination lock. The mechanical or electronic combination lock utilized by the safe shall have at least 10,000 possible combinations consisting of a minimum three numbers, letters, or symbols. The lock shall be protected by a case-hardened (Rc 60+) drill-resistant steel plate, or drill-resistant material of equivalent strength;

CAL DOJ STANDARDS: BOLTWORK

Boltwork shall consist of a minimum of three steel locking bolts of at least ½ inch thickness that intrude from the door of the safe into the body of the safe or from the body of the safe into the door of the safe, which are operated by a separate handle and secured by the lock;

CAL DOJ STANDARDS: CONSTRUCTION

◆ Shall be capable of repeated use. The exterior walls shall be constructed of a minimum 12-gauge thick steel for a singlewalled safe, or the sum of the steel walls shall add up to at least .100 inches for safes with two walls. Doors shall be constructed of a minimum of two layers of 12-gauge steel, or one layer of 7-gauge steel compound construction;

CAL DOJ STANDARDS: DOOR HINGES

Door hinges shall be protected to prevent the removal of the door. Protective features include, but are not limited to: hinges not exposed to the outside, interlocking door designs, dead bars, jeweler' s lugs and active or inactive locking bolts.

STANDARDS: NOT REAL-WORLD TESTS

- Standards do not protect consumers
- No testing of covert entry and mechanical bypass techniques
- Not real-world testing, aka "kids"
- Lowest common denominator for testing criteria was adopted for standards
- Allows certification of gun safes that can be opened in seconds by kids
- Most states rely on California as Model



SMALL GUN SAFES: MAJOR RETAILERS

amazon.com



EVERY SEASON STARTS AT

SPORTING GOODS



RETAILERS DON'T KNOW AND DON'T CARE: IT'S ALL ABOUT MONEY

- Contacted four major retailers to warn
 Only one was even concerned
 No action taken by any of them
- Stack-On: Absolutely no interest



MISREPRESENTATIONS ABOUT SECURITY

 California DOJ Certified ◆ Can be relied upon as secure ♦ Are safe to secure guns Cannot be opened by kids Only way to open: breaking ◆ Can be relied upon by consumer ♦ TSA Approved



DEALERS MISLEAD THE PUBLIC ABOUT SECURITY



EDDIE RYAN OWENS 11/27/06 - 09/15/2010



DETECTIVE OWENS CASE: Clark County Sheriffs Office

- 2003, Deputy's son shot 10-year old sister with service weapon
- Sheriffs office mandated all personnel use gun safes at home and office
- Purchased for \$36 each from Stack-On; several hundred units. State purchased thousands of them
- Mandated use for weapons at home and office and storage of evidence

STACK-ON SAFE FOR SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT

- UC Agent Eddie Owens had weapon in mandated safe in bedroom closet
- September 15, 2010, safe is accessed by child
- ♦ Three-year-old Eddie Ryan is shot and dies
- Investigation clears father
- Father is fired 14 months later for speaking up about defective safes
- Other deputies complain as well

♦ NO DNA TESTS **NO GSR TESTS ON VICTIM OR SISTER** ♦ NO FORENSIC ANALYSIS OF SAFE ♦ NO EXPERTISE BY LOCAL LAB NO UNDERSTANDING OF HOW THE SAFE WAS OPENED ◆ DON' T KNOW WHO FIRED THE WEAPON, ALTHOUGH 11-YEAR OLD SISTER CONFESSED

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

SECURITY LABS INVOLVEMENT FORENSIC INVESTIGATION

- Examined two safes from same batch;
- Analyzed bolt mechanism, solenoid;
- High speed video from inside of safe to document the problem;
- Analyzed similar safe from AMSEC, GUNVAULT, and BULLDOG;
- Contacted STACK-ON
- Expanded inquiry to all STACK-ON models



STACK-ON SAFE: FROM SAME BATCH



INTERNAL MECHANISM: THE DEFECTIVE DESIGN





HOW A THREE YEAR OLD CAN OPEN A SAFE





AMSEC DIGITAL: SAME DEFECTIVE DESIGN



OUR INVESTIGATION

FOUR MANUFACTURERS: AMSEC, STACK-ON, GUNVAULT, BULLDOG









ANALYZED 10 SAFES:All Defective Security DesignsSECURITY DESIGNS

- Push-Button keypad lock
- Fingerprint swipe reader biometric
- Fingerprint image reader biometric
- Multi-Button combination
- Key bypass: wafer or tubular lock

ALL COULD BE BYPASSED EASILY
NO SPECIAL TOOLS OR EXPERTISE

BYPASS TECHNIQUES

- COVERT ENTRY METHODS: NONE COVERED BY DOJ STANDARDS
- ♦ Shims
- Straws from McDonalds
- ♦ Screwdrivers
- Pieces of brass from Ace Hardware
- ♦ Paperclips
- ♦ Fingers

STACK-ON PC 650

PC-650 Portable Case with Electronic Lock

Electronic lock allows for a 3 to 8 digit combination to be programmed into the case. Includes a backup trouble key.

Slim line design of the case allows for storage in a briefcase, under the seat of many cars and trucks. Foam padded bottom protects contents from scratching.

Meets TSA airline firearm guidelines.

Body is designed for safe to be secured with steel cable (1500 lb. test). Cable is included.



8-1/4" deep [21 cm] 2-3/8" high [6 cm] [dimensions include key pad]









REMOVE RUBBER COVER







ACTIVATE LATCH





EASY LATCH ACCESS



BYPASS PROGRAM BUTTON



RE-PROGRAM THE CODE



SHIM THE WAFER LOCK







STACK-ON PDS 500 SAFE

PDS-500

Drawer Safe with Electronic Lock

Tested and listed as a California DOJ Firearm Safety Device.

2 live action locking bolts and concealed hinges.

Fastening hardware is included with each safe.

SPECS

11-13/16" wide [30 cm] 8-5/8" deep [22 cm] 4-3/8" high [11 cm]

MAKE A HOLE AND MANIPULATE MECHANISM



BYPASS SOLENOID WITH WIRE





WAFER LOCK BYPASS



SHIMS AND PAPER CLIPS







STACK-ON BIOMETRIC



FALSE PERCEPTION OF SECURITY FINGERPRINT READERS DON' T MEAN SECURITY

Great security for pistols, ammo and valuables at home, on the road or in the office.

Tested and listed as California Department of Justice firearms safety devices that conform to the requirements of California Penal Code Section 12088 and the regulations issued thereunder.

Solid steel, pry resistant, plate steel doors, steel live action locking bolts and concealed hinges provide greater security.

New models include **biometric locks** with back up electronic touch pad and trouble key.

Electronic lock can be programmed to "beep" when the numbers on the key pad are pressed or programmed to be silent.



FINGERPRINT READER AND WAFER LOCK = SECURITY



FINGERPRINT READER MODULAR MECHANISM



PUSH THE READER AND DISLODGE THE MODULE



ACCESS THE SOLENOID





WIRE OPENS THE SAFE



STACK-ON QAS 1200B BIOMETRIC SAFE

NEW

QAS-1200-B Quick Access Safe with Biometric Lock

Tested and listed as a California DOJ Firearm Safety Device.

Biometric Lock can accept 28 different fingerprints with back up trouble key. Biometric reader is easy to use and program. Biometric locks provide greater security – no combinations to remember.

Holds standard sized pistols and other valuables. Includes a removable shelf. Foam padded bottom and shelf.

Safe has pre-drilled holes for mounting to the floor, wall or a shell. Fastening hardware is included with each safe.

SPECS

10° wide (31,1 cm) 12-1/4° deep (30,5 cm) 8-1/4° high (21 cm) Idimensions include key padi



QAS 1200-B BIOMETRIC SAFE OPEN WITH PAPERCLIP



THE STACK-ON DESIGN





GLUE = STACK-ON SECURITY





HIGH-TECH TOOL TO OPEN: PAPERCLIP





OPENING THE QAS 1200-B



STACK-ON QAS-710

QAS-710 Drawer Safe with Motorized Electronic Lock

Tested and listed as a California DOJ Firearm Safety Device.

All steel construction and low profile design allows for storage in a drawer.

Lid pops up when the correct security code is entered for instant access.

Safe has pre-drilled holes for mounting in a drawer or on a shelf.

Fastening hardware is included with each safe.

SPECS

10-1/4" wide [26 cm] 16-5/8" deep [42.2 cm] 3-1/2" high [9 cm]



STACK-ON QAS-710

MOTORIZED MECHANISM
 ELECTRONIC KEYPAD

- Open with straw from McDonalds
- Open with brass shim
- Open with Screwdriver
- Reprogram the combination by accessing the reset switch



OPENING THE STACK-ON QAS-710 ELECTRONIC SAFE





GUNVAULT GV2000S





OPEN THE GUNVAULT





BULLDOG BD1500





OPEN THE BULLDOG



COMPETENT SECURITY ENGINEERING MATTERS SECURE PRODUCTS PROTECTION OF ASSETS, LIVES, AND PROPERTY

 DEFECTIVELY DESIGNED PRODUCTS HAVE CONSEQUENCES

♦ LIABILITY

♦ IF YOU HAVE ONE OF THESE SAFES

DefCon 20, July 2012

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